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Life and Death in Kentucky:
Past, Present, and Future
Roberta M. Harding1
“All over the United States there is a
growing sentiment to do away with
capital punishment . . . . If their mood
is reflected  in the letters they write me
daily, a large segment of the Kentucky people
want capital punishment abolished, too.”2
–Former Kentucky Governor Edward
Breathitt, May 5, 1965
The first officially recorded execution in Kentucky was carried out in 1780, the year after Kentucky County became the District of Kentucky of the 
1 William T. Lafferty Professor of Law.  Harvard Law School, JD(1986); University of San 
Francisco, BSBA (1981). I would like to thank third year law students Daniela Erazo and Rachel 
Warf, my Research Assistants, for the valuable contributions, research and data compilation, they 
made to this article. I also greatly appreciate the exceptional assistance provided by Beau Steen-
ken, Instructional Services Librarian & Instructor of Legal Research, and Tina Brooks, Electronic 
Services Librarian. And a special thanks to Beau Steenken for sharing his immense knowledge of 
legal history. His mastery of English and colonial legal history made it much easier for me to think 
and write about certain topics in this article. 
2 edward T. BreaThiTT, Address at University of Louisville Law Day (May 5, 1965), in The 
PuBlic PaPers of The Governors of KenTucKy, PaPers of edward T. BreaThiTT 468, 469 (Robert 
F. Sexton ed., 1984). Edward “Ned” Thompson Breathitt, a Democrat, served as the Common-
wealth of Kentucky’s 51st Governor from December 10, 1963 – December 12, 1967. Kentucky 
Governor Edward Thompson Breathitt, National Governors Association, http://www.nga.org/cms/
home/governors/past–governors–bios/page_kentucky/col2–content/main–content–list/title_brea-
thitt_edward.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2013); List of Governors of Kentucky, http://en.wikipedia.
org/w/index.php?title=List_of_Governors_of_Kentucky&oldid=566226955 (last visited Nov. 5, 
2013). The two Governors of the Confederate State of Kentucky are excluded from the roster of 
Kentucky Governors. See Ron D. Bryant, The Confederate Governors of Kentucky, KenTucKy 
GazeTTe, http://www.jkhg.org/kyconfgovs.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2013). See infra at note 32 for 
information about the Confederate State of Kentucky. 
1
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State of Virginia,3 when a man was hung for murder in Breckinridge County.4 
The next four executions also were carried out during Kentucky’s tenure as the 
District of Kentucky.5 These condemned and their predecessor had an attribute 
in common that is extremely germane to how the death penalty has been 
administered in Kentucky: their gender, which is male.6 A prodigious gender 
bias, which disfavors male capital offenders, is evident in Kentucky’s historic 
and contemporary death penalty practice. Since the first execution in 17807 and 
the last in 2008,8 the Commonwealth has executed 427 people.9  415 males 
and 12 females.10 The latter account for a paltry 3% of those executed by the 
Commonwealth, while men account for a whopping 97%! Amazingly the last 
time Kentucky executed a female capital offender was in the 19th century;11 
3 On May 23, 1609, approximately two years after the founding of the British Colony of 
Virginia, King James of England and Scotland signed The Second Charter of Virginia. The Charter 
granted the Virginia Company “the land, throughout from sea to sea, west and northwest . . . .” 
The Second Charter of Virginia § VI (1609), reprinted in 1 sTaTuTes aT larGe: a collecTion of 
all The laws of virGinia 80, 88 (William Waller Hening ed., 1823). “[A]s soon as it was apparent 
that the western country was to be settled,” Virginia created Fincastle County in 1772 from these 
lands to the west. Thomas d. clarK, a hisTory of KenTucKy 65 (The Jesse Stuart Foundation 
1988) (1937). Four years later, on the last day of the year America declared her independence from 
England, Kentucky County was formed out of Fincastle County. Id. at 46, 66. According to noted 
Kentucky historian Thomas D. Clark, the first permanent settlement of what would be Kentucky 
County had been established almost two years earlier on March 15, 1775. Id. at 42. In 1779, the 
Virginia legislature passed an Act making the County of Kentucky the District of Kentucky of the 
State of Virginia. 1779 Va. Acts 92, ch. XII, § VIII. 
4 See Kentucky Executions: 1780 – 1962, http://web.archive.org/web/20080617225325/us-
ers.bestweb.net/~rg/execution/KENTUCKY.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2013) [hereinafter Kentucky 
Executions] (identifying the man’s surname as Baysinger); Executions in the U.S. 1608 – 2002: 
The ESPY File, Executions by State 120, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/ESPYstate.
pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2013) [hereinafter ESPY File]. 
5 See ESPY File, supra note 4, at 120 (stating that the second execution was in 1785, the third 
and fourth ones in 1787, and the fifth in 1791).
6 See Kentucky Executions, supra note 4. Five years after Kentucky’s first execution, Peter 
Vigo was hanged for theft–stealing in Jefferson County. Two years later, in 1787, Daniel Coleman 
was hanged in Monroe County for arson and Cato Watts’ life ended on the scaffold in Jefferson 
County for the crime of murder. The last execution carried out prior to Kentucky obtaining its 
statehood was in 1791 when twelve–year–old Bill James was hanged for murder in Woodford 
County. Id.
7 See id. 
8 Marco Chapman, who died by lethal injection on November 21, 2008, was the last person, 
the 427,th executed by the Commonwealth. Marco Chapman, deaTh PenalTy informaTion cenTer, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/marco–chapman (last visited Nov. 5, 2013).
9 See ESPY File, supra note 4, at 120–131.
10 Id.
11 See Kentucky Executions, supra note 4. When 13–year–old Susan mounted the scaffold in 
Henry County on February 7, 1868 she became the last female and the 135th person executed by 
the state. She also is the third, as well as the second youngest and only female, of the ten juve-
nile capital offenders the Commonwealth executed. Id. Two juvenile capital offenders have been 
sentenced to death during the modern era of Kentucky’s death penalty practice. See infra note 13 
(discussing the commencement of the modern era of capital punishment in the United States). 
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while male capital offenders were executed for the remainder of the 19th 
century and in the 20th and 21st centuries.12 Contemporary capital sentencing 
statistics aptly convey how deeply entrenched this bias is in the operation of 
the death penalty. Since 1972, when the United States Supreme Court handed 
down its seminal decision in Furman v. Georgia,13 the Commonwealth has 
The first was Todd Ice, who was fifteen years old when he committed the offense for which he 
received a death sentence in 1980. american Bar ass’n, evaluaTinG fairness and accuracy in 
sTaTe deaTh PenalTy sysTems: The KenTucKy deaTh PenalTy assessmenT rePorT app. at C (2011), 
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/death_penalty_morato-
rium/final_ky_report.authcheckdam.pdf. Two years later Kevin Stanford was sentenced to death 
for a capital offense committed when he was seventeen years old. Id. at E. In 1984 the Kentucky 
Supreme Court reversed Ice’s conviction when the case was there for mandatory review. See Ice 
v. Commonwealth, 667 S.W.2d 671, 680 (Ky. 1984). Ice was retried and convicted of a lesser of-
fense and eventually served out his sentence. If, however, Ice had not received relief prior to June 
29, 1988, his death sentence would have been invalidated that day by the United States Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Thompson v. Oklahoma, where Five Justices agreed society opposed impos-
ing death sentences on capital offenders who were younger than sixteen years old at the time the 
crime was committed; consequently, the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments rendered this practice 
unconstitutional. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988). Kevin Stanford was not 
as fortunate as Ice because the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and his death sen-
tence. Stanford v. Commonwealth, 734 S.W.2d 781, 793 (Ky. 1987). And, despite its ruling the year 
before in Thompson, the United States Supreme Court was not persuaded by Stanford’s contention 
that the failure to exempt sixteen and seventeen year old capital offenders from the death penalty 
violated the Eighth and Fourteen Amendments. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) 
(plurality opinion). Close to a decade and a half later, Stanford found relief in the government’s 
executive branch when former Kentucky Governor Paul Patton commuted his death sentence to 
life without the possibility of parole or pardon in 2003. See Commutations in Capital Cases on 
Humanitarian Grounds, deaTh PenalTy informaTion cenTer, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
clemency (last visited Nov. 5, 2013). Ice and Stanford are the only two juvenile capital offenders 
to have death sentences imposed in Kentucky during capital punishment’s modern era: 1971 to the 
present. See infra note 13. 
12 See ESPY File, supra note 4, at 124–131.
13 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). The year before the United States 
Supreme Court had decided McGautha v. California. 402 U.S. 183(1971). The Court’s opinion in 
McGautha was featured in three of the four dissenting opinions in Furman,  Furman, 408 U.S. at 
375 (Burger, J., dissenting); id. at 405 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 413 (Powell, J., dissent-
ing), and since Furman invalidated death penalty legislation in 39 states, including Kentucky, id. at 
417 (Powell, J., dissenting), McGautha played a significant role in the effort by states to fashion a 
capital sentencing remedy that would comply with Furman. See, e.g., Ky. rev. sTaT. § 532.030(1) 
(1974); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 
(1976). Even though McGautha and Crampton based their challenge to the total discretionary 
capital sentencing scheme on the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, and the same 
challenge by Furman, Jackson, and Branch was based on the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, 
for the reasons stated above, I consider  McGautha the case that ushered in the modern era of the 
practice of capital punishment in the United States. Although Furman v. Georgia, which imposed 
a four–year legal moratorium on executions, was on its heels,  and then five years later by Gregg 
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), where the Court upheld the constitutionality of Georgia’s capital 
sentencing scheme.
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sentenced eighty–two people to death.14 96% were male and 4% were female.15 
Incredibly, these percentages are almost identical to those based on more than 
two centuries of execution data.16 The existence of this bias, however, is not 
unique to Kentucky; nor has it gone unacknowledged.17
14 Prior to the Court’s holding in Furman, Kentucky permitted the death penalty for multiple 
crimes, including murder, Ky. rev. sTaT. § 435.010 (1970), the rape of a child under the age of 
twelve, Ky. rev. sTaT. § 435.080(1) (1970), the rape of a female twelve or older, Ky. rev. sTaT. § 
435.090 (1970), and lynching or mob violence, Ky. rev. sTaT. § 435.070(2) (1970). The penalty 
decision was left entirely to the discretion of the sentencing authority, typically a jury. In Furman, 
however, five of the nine Justices concluded that “the imposition and carrying out of the death 
penalty in these cases constitute cruel and unusual punishments in violation of the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.” Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 240. For three of the Justices concurring 
in the judgment “the imposition . . . of the death penalty in these cases,” meant totally discretion-
ary capital sentencing schemes. Id. at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 306–07 (Stewart, J., 
concurring); id. at 310–14 (White, J., concurring). The other two concurring Justices, Brennan and 
Marshall, concluded the death penalty was per se unconstitutional. Id. at 257, 285, 305–06 (Bren-
nan, J. concurring); id. at 314, 370–71 (Marshall, J. concurring). As a result, on June 29, 1972, the 
“capital punishment laws of no less than 39 States,” id. at 417 (Powell, J. dissenting), including 
Kentucky’s, were “nullified,” id., which also had the consequence of transforming all but one of the 
50 states into abolitionist states. Id. at 417, note 2 (Rhode Island was the only remaining retention-
ist state because its sole capital statute called for a mandatory death sentence, which was beyond 
the purview of the Court’s holding). Two years after Furman Kentucky’s legislature enacted a new 
capital sentencing scheme, see  Ky. rev. sTaT. § 532.030(1) (1974), that went into effect January 1, 
1975. This statute was used to impose death sentences on Wallace Boyd, Boyd v. Commonwealth, 
550 S.W.2d 507 (Ky. 1977), Jimmy Self, Self v. Commonwealth, 550 S.W.2d 509 (Ky. 1977), and 
Ronnie Meadows, Meadows v. Commonwealth, 550 S.W.2d 511 (Ky. 1977): the first three people 
condemned in Kentucky during the post–Furman era. On July 2, 1976, however, the Kentucky leg-
islature learned the Court decided that a mandatory capital sentencing scheme, the type Kentucky 
adopted, see Ky. rev. sTaT. § 532.030(1) (1974), was incompatible with the rights guaranteed by 
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). 
Consequently, Kentucky, once again, found itself as a state without capital punishment. That same 
year Kentucky’s legislature convened and enacted yet another post–Furman capital sentencing 
scheme. When the Court struck down mandatory death sentences, it upheld several guided dis-
cretion capital sentencing schemes, see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153) (1976) (joint opinion), 
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976), and Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976), and Kentucky’s 
egislature decided to enact a guided discretion capital sentencing scheme modeled after Georgia’s, 
see Ky. rev. sTaT. §§ 532.030(1), (4) (1976), Ky. rev. sTaT. § 532.025 (1976), and Ky. rev. sTaT. 
§ 532.075 (1976), that went into effect December 22, 1976. Several months later the Kentucky 
Supreme Court reversed the death sentences imposed on Boyd, Self and Meadows and substituted 
terms of life imprisonment. See Boyd v. Commonwealth, 550 S.W.2d 507, 508–09 (Ky. 1977); 
Self v. Commonwealth, 550 S.W.2d 509, 510(Ky. 1977); Meadows v. Commonwealth, 550 S.W.2d 
511, 513(Ky. 1977). Seventy–nine others in Kentucky were sentenced to death post–Furman. See 
american Bar ass’n, supra note 10, at B–F. Their death sentences, however, were imposed in ac-
cordance with the guided discretion capital sentencing statutes, Ky. rev. sTaT. §§ 532.030(1),(4) 
(1976), Ky. rev. sTaT. § 532.025 (1976), and Ky. rev. sTaT. § 532.075(1976). Thus, between 1974 
and 2011 the Commonwealth has condemned eighty–two people.
15 See supra note 13.
16 See supra notes 8–10 and accompanying text. 
17 In 1972, a year after the commencement of the modern era of capital punishment, see supra 
note 13, Justice Marshall identified gender as one of several forms of discrimination long associ-
ated with the administration of capital punishment in the United States. Justice Marshall succinctly 
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The first five people executed also represent another inveterate basis 
for discrimination found in Kentucky’s historic and modern use of capital 
punishment: race. Baysinger, the first person to be executed, was white and the 
quartet following him were African–American.18 Thus, 80% of those executed 
when Kentucky was still a District were of color. This specific bias, as well 
as its tenacity and pervasiveness, are easily understood when the quartet’s 
status is considered: All were slaves.19 The institution of chattel slavery in 
Kentucky greatly affected the “racialization” of the administration of capital 
punishment in the Commonwealth. “Slavery existed in Kentucky from its first 
days of settlement”20 and was an important issue at the Convention to draft 
Kentucky’s First Constitution.21  Kentucky’s strong pro–slavery sentiment 
was embodied in Article IX of the First Constitution, which prohibited “the 
passage of legislation which tended to abolish slavery in the state.”22 The 
Constitutions produced at the Second and Third Constitutional Conventions, 
held respectively in 1799 and 1849, reinforced this institution of inequality by 
codifying assurances to protect slavery from being abolished.23 “The prominent 
described the situation as one with “overwhelming evidence that the death penalty is employed 
against men and not women. Only 32 women have been executed [nationally] since 1930, while 
3,827 men have met a similar fate.” Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 365 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
The Justice goes on to note that since “[m]en kill between four and five times more frequently than 
women,” id. at note 154, some of the incongruity might be attributed to differences in socializa-
tion, “[h]ence, it would not be irregular to see four or five times as many men executed as women. 
The statistics show a startlingly greater disparity, however.” Id. Fifteen years later, the gender 
issue surfaced in an important case in the Court’s body of capital jurisprudence. See McCleskey v. 
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). Here the Court not only acknowledged that gender plays a role in the 
sentencing authority’s decision to impose a death sentence, see id. at 315–17 & n.40, but also very 
likely the existence of this bias contributed toward the Court holding, despite statistical evidence 
of the racially discriminatory impact of the death penalty, findings the Court assumed were statisti-
cally valid, see id. at 291 n.7, Warren McCleskey, an African–American man, was not sentenced to 
death in a manner that violated either the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 319. 
18 ESPY File, supra note 4, at 120.
19 Kentucky Executions, supra note 4. 
20 Lowell H. Harrison, Slavery in Kentucky: A Civil War Casualty, 5 Ky. review 32, 32 
(1983). Historian Thomas Clark notes “it was only natural that the early pioneers should transfer 
the institution [of chattel slavery] from Virginia to their farms west of the mountains.” clarK, 
supra note 3, at 192.
21 See Harrison, supra note 20, at 32. In 1789 Virginia passed an Act supporting the District 
of Kentucky’s quest to attain independent statehood status. 1789 Va. Acts 10, ch. XIV. Two years 
later the First United States Congress consented to the formation of a “new State . . . within the 
jurisdiction of the Commonwealth of Virginia,” Act of Feb. 4, 1791, ch. 4, 1 Stat. 189 ( 1791), 
and to the admission of this new state “into this Union, by the name of the State of Kentucky.” 
Id. Since the District of Kentucky was scheduled to be admitted into the Union by June 1, 1792, a 
constitution had to be drafted and approved before then. clarK, supra note 3, at 92. This deadline 
was met when Kentucky’s First Constitution was approved April 19, 1792. Ky. consT. of 1792. 
Subsequently, on June 1, 1792 the District of Kentucky became the State of Kentucky and the 
fifteenth member of the Union. clarK, supra note 3, at 92. 
22 clarK, supra note 3, at 95. See also, Ky. consT. of 1792, art. IX.
23 clarK, supra note 3, at 113, 210–11, 305, 308, 310, 340; see also See Harrison, supra 
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place given the institution [of slavery] in the first three constitutions”24 led 
noted Kentucky historian Thomas Clark to describe Kentucky’s “hold on 
slavery”25 as “tenacious,”26 but strangely, “[w]hen the Civil War began, 
Kentucky was one of four slave states that remained in the Union.”27 As the 
War progressed, however, more and more Kentuckians became outraged by 
what they perceived to be a federal government that was increasingly taking 
on the abolitionists’ cause: “[t]hey were fighting for the preservation of the 
Union, not the destruction of slavery.”28 The mere suggestion of emancipation 
sent some to the verge of apoplexy. This fervor is illustrated by one newspaper 
editor’s impassioned comments: 
 [I]f the slaves were freed 200,000 soldiers would be
 required ‘to retain Kentucky in the Union, and then 
 the soldiers would be compelled to aid in exterminating 
 the black race.’ If the slaves were freed, he asserted, 
‘there is but one thing to be done with them; they must
 be wiped out—totally obliterated. It must be a merciless,
 savage extermination . . . . The two races . . . cannot
 exist in the same country, unless the black race is in slavery.29
Sentiments of this tenor were officially validated when the legislature passed 
a law permitting the enslavement of any African American entering Kentucky 
who stated they owed their freedom to the Emancipation Proclamation.30 
Kentuckians’ anger escalated when President Lincoln decided to recruit African 
Americans to fight in the war because “it challenged the basic assumption that 
blacks were inherently inferior to whites.”31 While Kentucky did not end up 
note 20, at 32 (“[T]he right of property is before and higher than any constitutional sanction, and 
the right of an owner of a slave to his property is the same and as inviolate as the right of an owner 
of any property whatsoever”) (quoting Ky. consT. of 1850, art. XII, § 3).
24 clarK, supra note 3, at 212.
25 Id.
26 Id. 
27 Harrison, supra note 20, at 32.
28 Id. at 33.
29 Id. at 34; see also id. at 35–36.
30 Id. at 36.
31 Id. In fact, the “state protests were so violent that the order was suspended until February 
1864.” Id.
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seceding,32 the legislature did refuse to ratify the Thirteenth Amendment.33 
Even after the Secretary of State announced the Amendment had been ratified, 
the Kentucky legislature “refused to change its stance”34 and again voted down 
ratifying the Amendment.35 By all indications, racial inequality had become 
indelibly ingrained in Kentucky’s social fabric, which adversely affected the 
workings of the state’s criminal justice system; especially when deciding who 
should live and who should die. 
 As noted earlier, the Commonwealth has executed 427 people.36 Racially, 
the overwhelming majority of people executed were either African–American, 
accounting for 54%, or Caucasian, accounting for 42%.37 Even though female 
capital offenders benefit greatly from the death penalty’s gender bias,38 the group 
is responsible for generating one of the most remarkable race and the death 
penalty statistics: Kentucky has only executed one Caucasian female, while 
83% of the females executed were African–American.39 Another astounding 
statistic from this category is that “no white man in Kentucky died on the 
gallows or in the electric chair for the rape of a black woman.”40 In Kentucky, 
more African–American men, 222,41 than Caucasian men, 177,42 lost their lives 
32 Although, slightly more than six months after the Civil War began, a group of Confeder-
ate sympathizers held a secession convention in Russellville, Kentucky. On November 20, 1861 
the unelected group proclaimed Kentucky’s secession from the Union and inaugurated George W. 
Johnson, who hailed from Scott County, as the first Governor of the Confederate State of Ken-
tucky. Even though Jefferson Davis, President of the Confederate States of America, harbored 
doubts about the legality of Kentucky’s secession on December 10, 1861, the Commonwealth 
of Kentucky became the thirteenth state of the Confederate States of America. After Governor 
Johnson died in battle on April 8, 1862, Richard Hawes, a resident of Bourbon County, became 
the second Governor of the Confederate State of Kentucky. He retained the position until the fall 
of the Confederacy. The tenure of the Confederate State of Kentucky was short–lived and had no 
effect on the Commonwealth of Kentucky’s status as a member of the United States of America. 
See Bryant, supra note 2.
33 Harrison, supra note 20, at 39.
34 Id. at 40.
35 Id. See also GeorGe c. wriGhT, racial violence in KenTucKy, 1865 – 1940, at 20 (1990). 
36 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
37 African–Americans and Caucasians account for 96% of the total. One Native American 
male was executed, see Kentucky Executions, supra note 4 (see execution 104), and the races of 16 
people, 3.7 % of those executed, are unknown. ESPY File, supra note 4, at 120–31.
38 See supra notes 6–17 and accompanying text (identifying and discussing the gender bias 
inherent in the administration of the death penalty).
39 ESPY File, supra note 4, at 120–23. Kentucky has executed twelve females. One Cauca-
sian female, one female whose race is unknown, and ten African–Americans. Id. 
40 wriGhT, supra note 35, at 299.
41 ESPY File, supra note 4, at 120 – 131. This figure excludes extra–judicial lynchings. See 
generally wriGhT, supra note 35, at 1–11, 13–14, 61–107, 166, 307–323. 
42 ESPY File, supra note 4, at 120 – 131. See also, Marco Chapman, supra note 8. Al-
though separated by more than two centuries, the first person and the last the Commonwealth 
executed were Caucasian men. Id.; see also ESPY File, supra note 4, at 120.
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on the scaffold, in the electric chair, or on the gurney.43 Eight men belonging 
to the former group, however, lost their lives because of how a facially race 
neutral law was applied. Action taken by the legislature in the early twentieth 
century fostered some hope that the execution of Roger Warren, an African–
American male, on May 25, 1911 would be the last execution carried out by 
hanging.44  The year before the legislature authorized switching the state’s sole 
method of execution from hanging to electrocution.45 In addition, executions 
were to “take place within the walls of the State penitentiary”46 away from the 
purview of the public.47 This hope was reinforced when eighteen year old James 
Buckner, African–American like his predecessor Roger Warren, christened 
Kentucky’s electric chair “Ole’ Sparky” on July 8, 1911.48 Nine years later the 
outcome in a capital case in Lexington involving an African American man 
accused of murdering and raping a ten year old white female would land a 
cruel blow to hopes about transforming the relationship between the rope and 
violence. In February 1920, twenty three year old Will Lockett confessed to 
murdering young Geneva Hardman.49 Given the circumstances, the sexual 
assault, the victim/defendant racial and gender paradigm: white female victim 
and black male defendant, and the girl’s tender age, the authorities “[f]ear[ed] a 
mob might storm the jail [so they]  . . . rushed [Lockett] to the state penitentiary 
in Frankfort.”50 The next day Lockett was indicted for murder and the judge 
43 In 1965 Kentuckians were officially put on notice about their racially skewed death penalty 
when then Governor Breathitt informed them that “[s]ince the electric chair was placed in opera-
tion at Eddyville State Penitentiary in 1911, some 162 men have been electrocuted. Of this number, 
approximately one–half have been Negroes.” BreaThiTT, supra note 2, at 469.
44 For 130 years, hanging was the state’s official method of execution. See ESPY File, supra 
note 4, at 127. Since rope was an item commonly used to lynch people, a sense of incongruity as-
sociated with the state’s “official” method of execution developed because it too called for a rope. 
In fact, in the context of lynching, someone aptly described the rope as a “white man’s death.” 
wriGhT, supra note 35, at 92. For example, one Christmas Day, the day before a black man’s mur-
der trial was scheduled to start, even though “[t]he county judge and prosecuting attorney [were] 
. . . confident that the law would have punished [the man],” id. at 74 (emphasis added), a mob 
extracted him from the jail and “hanged him from a tree in the courthouse yard.” Id. (emphasis 
added). That same week, but in a different part of Kentucky, another black man was removed from 
the local jail and “carried to the courthouse yard and hanged.” Id. at 75 (emphasis added). Given 
this longstanding “connection” between hanging and lynching, the hope was that adopting a dif-
ferent method to use for state sanctioned killing would eventually check the strength of the rope’s 
ability to legitimize lethal violence. 
45 See Act of March 15, 1910, ch. 38, §1, 1910 Ky. Acts 111.
46 Id.
47 See wriGhT, supra note 35, at 255–56.
48 See Electric Chair Used in Kentucky, n.y. Times, July 9, 1911. wriGhT, supra note 35, at 
275 & n.27. 
49 wriGhT, supra note 35, at 194.
50 Id. Wright mentions Lockett might also have sexually assaulted little Geneva, but to ex-
pedite the process, Lexington officials decided to only indict Lockett on murder. Id. at 256. Docu-
ments containing information about the 427 people executed in Kentucky, however, list murder 
and rape as the capital crimes Lockett was found guilty of committing. ESPY File, supra note 4, at 
life and death in kentucky 92013– 2014 ]
vowed “there would be no delay . . . and that the trial would start . . . Monday, 
[February 9, 1920] only five days after the murder.”51 The Governor promised 
“Lexington officials that troops would be sent to protect Lockett on his return to 
the city.”52 The press did its best to  quell the public’s call for mob violence by 
assuring people that “Lockett’s trial would be quick and the outcome certain”53 
and they were: in less than thirty minutes Lockett was convicted, though by 
pleading guilty he helped honor the pledge that justice would be swift,54 and 
“sentenced . . . to die in the electric chair.”55 “Although elated . . . a number 
of Lexington whites expressed the belief that . . . Lockett should have been 
made to suffer by dying at the end of a rope [in public for sexually assaulting 
Geneva].”56 The legislature’s response to this suggestion was extraordinarily 
fast and a week after Lockett died by electrocution57the legislature approved 
an Act to amend section one of the execution by electrocution statute by 
adding the following: “Except in cases where the accused has been adjudged to 
suffer a death sentence for the crime of rape or attempted rape, in which event 
sentence shall be executed by hanging the condemned in the county in which 
the crime was committed.”58 The hanging was supposed to be done “within 
an enclosure”59 and before no more than “one hundred persons.”60 Although 
this law was race neutral, its application decidedly was not. Nine men were 
executed in accordance with this law and all were men of color.61
127; Kentucky Executions, supra note 4.
51 wriGhT, supra note 35, at 195.
52 Id. (emphasis added).
53 Id. (emphasis added).
54 Id. at 195.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 256 (emphasis added).
57 Will Lockett was executed in the electric chair on March 11, 1920. See ESPY File, supra 
note 4, at 127.
58 See Act of March 17, 1920, ch. 163, §1, 1920 Ky. Acts 693; Kentucky Statutes § 1137–1 
(1920).
59  See Act of March 17, 1920, ch. 163, §1, 1920 Ky. Acts 693.
60 Id. at 693. George Wright recounts occasions when this provision was blatantly disre-
garded. See wriGhT, supra note 35, at 256–57. Rainey Bethea’s public hanging in Owensboro, 
Kentucky on August 14, 1936 attracted thousands of people. Id. at 257–58. It should also be noted 
that Kentucky was “the last state in which public hangings were conducted.” Id. at 258.
61 ESPY File, supra note 4, at 128–29. After the Rainey Bethea fiasco, it was decided John 
Montjoy and Harold Venison, the last two men who had their death sentences imposed under the 
1920 amendment, should still die on the gallows but not in public venues. wriGhT, supra note 
35, at 258. Even though legislation repealing this amendment to Kentucky Statute § 1137–1 was 
passed and approved in March 1938, see Act of March 12, 1938, ch.131, 1938 Ky. Acts 640, only 
a few months before Venison’s execution was scheduled, he still had to be executed by hanging, 
which was done on June 3, 1938. ESPY File, supra note 4 at 129. Electrocution was restored as 
Kentucky’s sole method of execution. See Kentucky Statutes § 1137–1 (1938). In 1998 Kentucky 
made lethal injection the state’s second method of execution. Ky. rev. sTaT. § 431.220. However, 
both methods are only available to people sentenced to death on or before March 31, 1998. Id. 
Kentucky Law Journal online10 [ Vol. 102
This law’s success, as well as securing death sentences against African 
American capital offenders in general, was greatly dependent upon having 
accommodating juries. This was best achieved by seating all white juries, 
which was easy to accomplish when African Americans were statutorily 
expressly barred from being jurors. In the late 19th century, however, the United 
States Supreme Court created two obstacles in an effort to end this long–
standing discriminatory practice: it held that statutes expressly prohibiting 
African Americans from serving on juries, and racially neutral statutes applied 
in a manner that accomplishes the same result, violate the accused’s and 
the excluded potential jurors’ right to equal protection under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.62 As a result, a greater cost was attached to seating an all white 
jury: violating the defendant’s and potential jurors’ constitutional rights. Smith 
v. Commonwealth63 and Hale v. Commonwealth64 are representative of the 
problem. Smith, “a negro,”65 was indicted for murder by an all white grand 
jury and another all white jury found him guilty as charged and sentenced him 
to death. On appeal he contended his conviction was invalid because it was 
no accident that he, “a negro,” was indicted, tried, and convicted by all white 
juries. Smith apprised the Kentucky Court of Appeals that about twenty percent 
of the voters in Hardin County were African American and fifteen percent of 
them were eligible for jury service; yet, the jury commissioners, white men, 
never selected them.66 The court gave short shrift to Smith’s argument, “finding 
no error” and affirmed the judgment.67 Three decades later another ”negro,”68 
Joe Hale, also convicted of murder and sentenced to death, revisited the issue 
with the Kentucky Court of Appeals. Hale had evidence to prove that “going 
back as far as 1906, no member of the African race had been summoned or 
served on a grand or a petit jury in McCracken county.”69 He argued:
[T]he foregoing facts, when proved, show a long continued, 
unvarying and wholesale exclusion of negroes from jury 
service in this county on account of their race and color; that it 
has been systematic and arbitrary on the part of the officers and 
commissioners who select the names for jury service, for a period 
of fifty years or longer.70 
62 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 307 (1880).
63 Smith v. Commonwealth, 91 S.W. 742 (Ky. 1906).
64 Hale v. Commonwealth, 108 S.W.2d 716 (Ky. 1937), rev’d, 303 U.S. 613 (1938) (per 
curiam).
65 Smith v. Commonwealth, 91 S.W. at 742.
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Hale v. Commonwealth, 108 S.W.2d at 716.
69 Id. at 717.
70 Id. at 718 (emphasis added).
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The court detected problems with Hale’s proof, starting with his failure to 
include evidence in the record proving he “was a member of the African race,”71 
but the court was forgiving of this evidentiary omission and conceded that “the 
court no doubt by observation knew that fact to be true.”72 The court’s greatest 
concern was about what it deemed Hale’s “failure to charge therein as grounds 
therefore, that such exclusion of members of the African race from service on 
juries was superinduced and occurred ‘solely because they were members’ of 
that race.”73  The United States Supreme Court, however, saw the evidence 
offered by Hale in an entirely different light: “We are of the opinion that the 
affidavits . . . sufficed to show a systematic and arbitrary exclusion of negroes 
from the jury lists solely because of their race or color, constituting a denial 
of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed to petitioner by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”74 The Court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for 
“further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.”75 Unfortunately, 
Kentucky did not heed the Court’s admonishment that “proceedings not be 
inconsistent with that opinion” because in 1986, almost half a century later, 
the state found itself back in front of the Court for the same practice: excluding 
African Americans from being jurors.76 In this round, the state’s exclusionary 
strategy involved exercising peremptory challenges as a way to get rid of 
African Americans77 [in order to seat an all white or as close to all white jury 
as possible]. Once again, the Court chided the Commonwealth for violating 
constitutional rights that are guaranteed to everyone, regardless of color, creed, 
gender or religion.
Discriminatory practices continue to plague the administration of capital 
punishment in Kentucky,78 despite the fact the Commonwealth was at the 
vanguard with respect to following a recommendation made by the Supreme 
Court in 1987 that racial problems associated with the use of the death penalty 
be resolved through legislation.79 And in 1998, Kentucky became the first 
jurisdiction in the United States to enact a Racial Justice Act.80 Yet, there are 
71 Id. at 717.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 718.
74 Hale v. Kentucky, 303 U.S. 613, 616 (1938) (per curiam).
75 Id. 
76 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
77 Id. at 79–80.
78 See american Bar ass’n, supra note 10, at 345–378. 
79 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 319 (1987). 
80 The Racial Justice Act went into effect on July 15, 1998. Ky. rev. sTaT. § 532.300. More 
than a decade passed before another retentionist state followed Kentucky’s lead. In August 2009, 
North Carolina became the second state to enact a Racial Justice Act for capital cases. See Race and 
the Death Penalty, deaTh PenalTy informaTion cenTer, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
race–and–death–penalty (last visited Nov. 5, 2013). For more information about Kentucky’s 
Racial Justice Act see Gennaro Vito, The Racial Justice Act in Kentucky, 37 n. Ky. l. rev. 273, 
276–78 (2010).
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lingering concerns about the Act’s effectiveness.81 The pervasiveness of gender 
discrimination is disheartening; especially when one remembers that the 
proportion of women and men sentenced to death in Kentucky during capital 
punishment’s modern era is almost the same as the proportion of the women 
and men executed over a period of time exceeding two centuries.82 Is history 
repeating itself? Or, is it simply that little has changed at the core in the use 
of the death penalty? If so, then perhaps now is the time to implement real 
tangible change. Certain considerations indicate change might be warranted. In 
1962 Kelly Moss was executed.83 The following year the people of Kentucky 
elected Edward Breathitt to serve as the Commonwealth’s Chief Executive 
and he “brought an already strong aversion to capital punishment with him 
to the governorship.”84  “In the 1964 General Assembly he endorsed a bill 
abolishing the death penalty.”85 He also “announced a general stay of execution 
for all condemned state prisoners until he could place the measure before the 
legislature once again in 1966.”86 So, for several years, Kentucky could be 
considered a de facto abolitionist jurisdiction. Three decades passed before 
Kentucky carried out another execution.87 These thirty plus years include 
periods of time when Kentucky actually did not have capital punishment 88and 
when Kentuckians decided to partially abolish the death penalty by forbidding 
it to be imposed on a segment of the population.89 Only two people have been 
executed since McQueen was in 1997 and both were volunteers.90 Therefore, 
81 See, e.g., Vito, supra note 80, at 279–80; See american Bar ass’n, supra note 11, at 345–
378.
82 This is the period of time between the first execution in 1780 and the last one in 2008. See 
ESPY File, supra note 4, at 121; Marco Chapman, supra note 8.
83 Breathitt, supra note 2, at 471, n. 3; EPSY File, supra note 4, at 131. Moss was the last 
person the state executed prior to capital punishment’s modern era. See supra note 13.
84 BreaThiTT, supra note 2, at 471, n.3. 
85 Id. The measure, however, was unsuccessful.
86 Id.
87 Harold McQueen was executed by electrocution on July 1, 1997. He was the first person 
the Commonwealth executed in more than thirty decades . ESPY File, supra note 4, at 131. 
88 Kentucky was a non–retentionist state from June 29, 1972 until December 31, 1974 and 
from July 2, 1976 until December 21, 1976. See supra note 14. 
89 In 1990 the people of the Commonwealth decided to abolish the death penalty for intel-
lectually disabled individuals. See Ky. rev. sTaT. §§ 532.130, 532.135, 532.140. This is another 
instance where Kentucky was one of the first jurisdictions to dismantle part of its death penalty 
practice. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 334 (1989) (noting that in 1988 Georgia had partially 
abolished the death penalty in the same way and Maryland had but the law did not go into effect 
until July 1, 1989). 
90 Edward Harper Jr. and Marco Chapman, respectively executed in 1999 and 2008, ESPY 
File, supra note 4, at 131, Marco Chapman, supra note 8, were volunteers, see Information on 
Defendants Who Were Executed Since 1976 and Designated as “Volunteers”, deaTh PenalTy 
informaTion cenTer, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/information–defendants–who–were–ex-
ecuted–1976–and–designated–volunteers (last visited Nov. 5, 2013), which in some cases is con-
sidered tantamount to “suicide by state.” See Michael Blume, Killing the Willing: “Volunteers,” 
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it has been sixteen years since Kentucky has used its execution machinery on 
a non–volunteer. During what collectively amounts to a significant period of 
time, there was not nor has there been a public outcry when the death penalty 
has been absent, de jure or de facto, from the Commonwealth. Perhaps that 
means the time is ripe for changes to be made; specifically, those of the 
magnitude sufficient to stop Kentucky from going round and round and round 
on the death penalty wheel, continually repeating the longstanding problems 
associated with the state’s death penalty practice.
Suicide and Competency,  deaTh PenalTy informaTion cenTer, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
documents/BlumeVolunteerArticle.pdf. Currently, Kentucky has 33 condemned inmates. All but 
one are male. See Kentucky Department of Corrections, Death Row Inmates, http://corrections.
ky.gov/communityinfo/pages/deathrowinmates.aspx (last visited Nov. 5, 2013).
